departed, writing bitterly to his wife, Auguste-Aemilia, the following day: "I am not inclined to serve under the king of Naples." Yet, he explained in resignation, that he had to remain at his post despite the deplorable conditions and his new commander. The day after he wrote again, "The Emperor is gone and left me with the king." He was depressed, frustrated and angered: "G-d preserve me," he lamented, ".. .my corps is reduced to nothing."8 Davout too kept silent and did not reveal his true feelings until some weeks later. He believed that the existing circumstances rightly dictated Napoleon's return to Paris. Murat's appointment, however, shocked Davout, who thought the choice unfortunate and blamed it upon Napoleon's personal fondness for Murat, without due regard to the realities of the situation or Murat's limitations. No doubt angered and hurt, he observed that he was never shown such favoritism or consideration despite his exemplary service over the years. Thus, Davout felt deeply slighted by Napoleon's appointment of Murat.9 More than this, Davout had very little respect for Murat and had come to count the one-time King of Naples among his enemies.10
Count Philippe de Segur later recalled misgivings concerning Murat's appointment:
In the empty space left by his [Napoleon's] going, Murat was hardly visible. We realized then-and only too well-that a great man cannot be replaced; either because his subordinates' pride forbids them to obey another, or because .. .he had formed only able lieutenants, but no leaders.1" Marshal Macdonald believed that Napoleon chose poorly in relying on Murat. Saint-Cyr, who no longer commanded a corps, as he was recovering from wounds, later recalled with displeasure Murat's appointment. 12 While the command of the GrandeArmie came undone, the Emperor made his way homeward, confident in the army's resurrection at Vilna and unaware of the reality of the situation. When Murat, Berthier, and the first troops arrived at Vilna on 9 December, they abandoned Napoleon's scheme. Taking stock of the local conditions and the state of the army, Murat ordered the evacuation of the city the following day.
Eugene to
When Murat looked at the actual number of troops available, he found he could not count on more than twenty thousand dribbling into Vilna from the remnants of the central column that had marched to Moscow. Outside of the main column, there were probably no more than another twenty thousand, who were making their way back along their own routes. Macdonald's left wing was still in good shape with some twenty-three thousand Prussians, Poles, and Germans. Prince Karl Philipp Schwarzenberg's right wing numbered forty-three thousand men, more than half of whom were part of the Austrian Auxiliary Corps; the remainder were Poles, Saxons, and French, from the VII Saxon and V Polish corps under General Jean-Louis Ebenezer Reynier and Prince Jozef Poniatowski, respectively. To this, one could add the reinforcements which were already en route to Russia, totalling another sixty thousand. By an objective accounting, the total of available forces would have easily exceeded one hundred sixty thousand men.13 Yet, perceptions often obscure reality and consequently the psychological impact of the retreat overrode any sense of rational objectivity.
A level-headed assessment of imperial forces was largely the responsibility of Berthier, but he lost sight of the larger picture and fell victim to despair. In the midst of such a human tragedy, the heart loses hope and the head tends to follow. From Vilna, an overwhelmed and disheartened Berthier wrote Napoleon: "Sire, I must tell you the truth. The army is in a complete state of chaos. The soldiers throw away their guns because they cannot hold them; both officers and soldiers think only of protecting themselves from the terrible cold."14 Significantly, the French line of communications broke down at this critical juncture. Napoleon did not receive this or any other correspondence from Russia until he was in Paris at the end of December. In the meantime, the army and its leaders were on their own. It was Murat's responsibility to restore order and instil confidence in his men, yet he was not up to the great task.
At Kovno on 12 December, Murat sought the council of the other marshals. Their corps were shells of their former selves, so that to hold there was an impossibility. The marshals had not the will for it, nor perhaps 13. Richard K. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign (New York: McGrawHill, 1990), 395. Riehn's numbers are quite plausible, including the return to service of fifteen thousand troops who were sick in hospital.
14. Berthier to Napoleon, Vilna, dated 5 a.m., 9 December 1812, cited in Eugene Tarle, Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), 390. The letters from Berthier to Napoleon, published by Tarle, were all captured by Cossacks and were placed in the Russian archives. THE JOURNAL OF the means. All present determined that the army could only be saved by putting space between themselves and the Russians in effect, trading territory for time. They believed that only then could the army be rallied and reorganized.l5 Hence, the army would retire to the Vistula and abandon all of eastern Poland to the Russians. Berthier vividly conveyed the desperate situation and attitude of the marshals to Napoleon that day:
The measures taken for organizing our stay in Vilna have come to nothing through the lack of discipline... . It was true enough-the Grande Armee had ceased to exist. Marshals marched with their men, Eugene and Ney both carried muskets. When the retreating horde reached the town of Gumbinnen, there was a sense of relief; at last they were on the soil of their Prussian ally. Eugene did not believe the Russians would pursue the army into Prussia. There, they could rest and reform; with luck, he would be ordered back to Italy where he could be with his wife and children.17 In the meantime, the imperial prince continued his march to the Vistula. Elsewhere, Murat established his headquarters in Konigsberg, and Berthier began to take stock of the army. Now he could again attempt to assess the forces available to him.
For all of Berthier's administrative skill, such an accounting was impossible. He sent daily letters to the marshals requesting, and at times, even begging for an official report on the state of their corps. The breakdown of the army and the anarchy which reigned among the rank-andfile made it impossible to determine the exact condition of the imperial army. Responding to Berthier's requests on Christmas Eve, Marshal Davout wrote: "I have no information on the cavalry of the 1st Corps, I presume they have followed with the entire cavalry of the army in the direction of Elbing." The remainder of Davout's corps were still trickling in to his headquarters at Thorn. A stream of stragglers continued to arrive through the end of December and beyond.18 Lack of knowledge and the uncertainty of dispositions only increased the sense of frustration and hopelessness of the imperial command.
The severity of the situation and the chaos, as well as the lack of confidence in Murat's leadership, agitated tensions which were slowly beginning to emerge. Berthier, the great chief of staff, was now fifty-nine and physically exhausted. As the task of reorganizing the army moved from theory to practice, it proved too much even for Berthier. Rallying and reorganizing the army involved more than a head count of those present; it required human resources which were simply unavailable. Once these soldiers reached Prussia, they had to be sorted out and sent to their corps. To do this, however, some organization of officers or gendarmes was required to send the soldiers on their way. This was not possible. The retreating masses had no organization. Corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions were inextricably intermixed. Germans marched with Poles, who followed Italians, who were in turn accompanied by Frenchmen. There was no rhyme or reason, merely chaos. The fleeing remnants had to find their own way back to their regiments, and some decided to continue home instead. Berthier too had his problems. The chief of staff could not sort out the administrative nightmare that must have kept him furiously engaged for weeks. The strain of the campaign and the stress of responsibility now took its toll. Berthier's health had not been good; now he was struck with an attack of gout so painful that he was unable to work for long periods of time.25 Consequently, by mid-January 1813, the onus of administration was removed from his shoulders and given to General Count Mathieu Eugene also wrote to Napoleon and informed him of Murat's resignation. He advised the Emperor that he had temporarily accepted command until someone else could be appointed.36 Describing the state of affairs at headquarters, Eugene declared with some dismay: "There is no marshal of the empire here, and I find myself the sole lieutenant of your majesty."37 The following day, Eugene took stock of the situation and found himself at a loss. "At the present this devil of a king of Naples has left me this great mess," he confided to his wife in a frustrated and angry letter. Eugene was unsure if he was equal to the task. Dispirited, he wrote to Auguste two days later, "I am holding up well, but I find the burden of commander in chief heavy. I have found in all these affairs a great disorder. ... It cannot be said that it is by an ambition for glory that I have accepted [to be] commander in chief, but it is by devotion to the Emperor."38 Eugene informed Napoleon of the critical condition in which Murat had left the army. He found unanswered correspondence from Schwarzenberg, Poniatowski, and Reynier, and learned that these generals had received no instructions for some time. The issue of reinforcements was a sore topic for Eugene and the leadership of the GrandeArm6e. After the army's arrival in Prussia and Poland, several garrison battalions had been dispatched to the seriously depleted corps, but they were too few to make a significant impact on the condition of the army.47 Napoleon had promised reinforcements back in December, and claimed he "already [had] an army of 40,000 at Berlin and on the Oder."48 By the first week of January, however, the "army of 40,000" had still not materialized. Even by mid-January, the only "substantial" reinforcements that had appeared on the Vistula were four to five thousand Bavarians under General Carl Phillip von Wrede, and twelve hundred Westphalians under General Andre Junot.49 Symptomatic of the failure to provide forces and the terrible problems of leadership, Junot resigned his command within three weeks, claiming a "poor state of health."50
The lack of reinforcements, the horrible condition of the army, and the difficulties of command perpetuated the strategy of surrendering land for time. Certainly Napoleon had approved of this after he was informed of the abandonment of Vilna, but he expected that Eugene could hold the Vistula, if not the Oder.51 Napoleon, though, was too far removed from the theater of war to understand the evolving situation in a timely manner. While conditions changed daily, he received letters from Poland approximately one week after they were sent.52 On 26 January, Napoleon Although Napoleon remained ill informed concerning events in Poland, on 26 January he sent the long-awaited news of reinforcements. Napoleon ordered forty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, including Grenier's divisions, now constituted as XI Corps, to the city of Posen. This pleasant surprise was followed with a second encouraging letter which installed Marshal Ney, who had just recovered his health, as commander of the new corps.54 Unfortunately, it is likely that these dispatches arrived after Eugene had received Napoleon's letter of 23 January, which ordered Marshal Davout to Magdeburg. The Grande Armee had been in retreat since October 1812. In December it was abandoned by Napoleon and, shortly thereafter, by some of its marshals and generals. The leadership seemed to exhaust itself in coping with the severity of their defeat. Murat and Berthier, the two who were supposed to breathe some life back into the army, failed miserably. Perhaps one cannot blame them, for they too suffered both physically and mentally in the retreat. Never had French arms experienced such a cataclysmic reverse, certainly not during the reign of Napoleon.
The initial choice of Murat as commander of the Grande Armee was clearly made to maintain, if not build, the morale of the army. Yet it had the opposite effect on the marshals and generals. Napoleon knew that his lieutenants were difficult to handle, but under his strong and decisive leadership they performed marvels. Murat was not the leader to galvanize a demoralized army, and in this instance he certainly proved incapable of restoring confidence and moral strength to the marshals and generals, who knew Murat well as a solid cavalry commander, but nothing more. Only Murat's relations with Napoleon and his title of king were useful. The generals, Napoleon believed, would obey his brother-in-law, and the ranking officer in the army. Despite some minor complaints, such as those of Davout, Murat might have succeeded in his command. In such a desperate time, reassurance and cooperation were vital and might have saved the army. But Murat fell completely short of restoring the morale by failing to maintain communications, provide constant direction, and serve as an example. Murat's failure to grasp command was indicative of a more general problem that plagued the army: not only the soldiers suffered terrible demoralization, but the marshals and generals as well. They saw in the Russian debacle the end of their boundless and Alexandrian conquests. In the end, one can be sure only that Napoleon's presence with the army would have maintained, if not restored, the morale of the army, and more importantly that of the marshals and generals. How many of his lieutenants would have petitioned to be relieved of command if the Emperor remained? In his absence, only a few ultimately stayed with their troops, trying to restore some order to the chaos. They developed hostility toward Murat and Berthier for their inability to lead when leadership was so desperately needed. The dynamics of defeat were such that in the absence of centralized leadership, what emerged was a cooperative effort. What maintained the army after the departure of Napoleon and throughout was the determination of a handful of men, notably Davout, Eugene, and Poniatowski, to work together, rely on and find comfort from each other, and know that they were not alone, when it seemed as if the world had abandoned them. 75 . Rothenberg, Napoleon's Great Adversary, 227-29.
